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Abstract
This speech discusses recent policy developments and future trends in European Competition
Policy.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure to address this distinguished forum at
Fordham University School of Law and to be given the opportunity to share with you some thoughts on recent policy developments and future trends in European Competition Policy.
I. COMPETITIONPOLICY IN AN INTEGRATING
CONTINENTAL ECONOMY
A. Integration and Competition: The Challenges
Let me start with some reflections on the broad context in
which Competition policy operates in Europe.
As you are aware, Competition policy is one of the major
pillars on which the action of the European Union ("Union") in
the economic field rests. The Union has similarly broad supranational powers only in trade policy and, more recently, since
the creation of the European Central Bank, in monetary policy.
The Union, and in particular the European Commission
("Commission"), has been assigned such broad powers in the
competition field in order to ensure application of the principle,
enshrined in the European Community Treaty ("EC Treaty"),'
* Member, European Commission, Brussels. This Essay is the result of a speech
given at the Twenty-eighth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, sponsored by the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, New York, U.S.A.,
Oct. 20, 2000.
1. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, art. 4 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges
made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C
340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and the Treaty
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of "an open market economy with free competition." Since its
adoption over forty years ago, the EC Treaty acknowledges the
fundamental role of the market and of competition in guaranteeing consumer welfare, encouraging the optimal allocation of
resources, and granting economic agents the appropriate incentives to pursue productive efficiency, quality, and innovation.
Personally, I believe that this principle of an open market
economy does not imply an attitude of unconditional faith with
respect to the operation of market mechanisms. On the contrary, it requires a serious commitment-as well as self-restraint-by public powers, aimed at preserving those mechanisms. An open market economy can only be effectively maintained by preventing collusive agreements between firms or
abuses of a dominant position, by ensuring competitive market
structures through merger control, and by abolishing unjustified
State subsidies that distort competition by artificially keeping
non-viable firms in business.
I consider all these legal instruments-antitrust rules,
merger control, and State aid provisions-as different tools at
our disposal to achieve a single aim: to maintain a vibrant and
competitive economy in Europe. The modernization of our
economy, as underlined by the European Heads of State and
Governments in the Lisbon summit last spring, requires speeding up the processes of liberalization and structural reforms in
order to make our markets function smoothly. As Commissioner
in charge of Competition Policy, I am determined to contribute
to this aim through a strict application of all the legal tools
under my responsibility.
The combination of liberalization processes and strict enforcement of competition rules indeed brings benefits to European consumers. For example: thanks to liberalization and
competition, residential telephone tariffs for international calls
fell, on average, by forty percent between 1997 and 1999 in most
Member States. Not only did competition result at lower prices;
it also gave rise to a considerable increase in the supply of new
and efficient services. I do not believe that these developments
are the natural and inevitable consequence of technological development. Rather, I am convinced that without a firm liberalizestablishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
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ing attitude and the careful scrutiny of these processes, we would
not have achieved such downward pressure on tariffs, or such
upward growth in quality, variety, and innovation.
Competition policy is also strictly connected with another of
the fundamental objectives of the EC Treaty, namely the creation of the Single Market. After having painstakingly dismantled
the barriers to trade represented by the national laws and regulations, we must be watchful for them not to be replaced by market segmentations introduced by firms.
In my first term of office, over the last five years, as Commissioner for the Single Market, I have been deeply committed to
pursuing State measures that prevented the Single Market from
becoming a reality. Now, my attention has turned to the practices of economic operators-or of Member States themselves, in
the area of State Aids-that have the same effect or distort the
functioning of the single market in those sectors where it already
has been or it is being achieved.
To give you a concrete example, having overseen the removal of any of the State barriers that stood in the way of consumers wishing to purchase a motorcar in the Member State of
their choice, I am not amused to find that some car producers
have been seeking to prevent such transactions by way of agreement with their distributors. The Commission has already imposed substantial fines on car producers engaging in such practices (e.g., Opel, Volkswagen) and is presently investigating several others. The elimination of the practices by firms that
prevent the Single Market from becoming a reality continues to
be one of my main goals.
B. Modernizing the Tools
In order to contribute efficiently to achieve the goals I have
mentioned-in a nutshell, to ensure competitive and integrated
markets in Europe-we need effective tools. The Commission
has recently devoted particular efforts to modernize the legal instruments that constitute the basis of our competition policy.
On September 27, 2000, the Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation designed to modernize the rules implementing the antitrust provisions (Articles 81 and 82) of the EC
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Treaty. 2 I consider this to be the most important legislative initiative in Europe in the competition field since the adoption of
the Merger Regulation in 1989. It will change radically the way
antitrust rules are enforced. It will allow the Commission to focus on the most serious infringements and, in my view, to greatly
facilitate the strengthening of a common competition culture in
the Union.
I am pleased to note that this proposal is the topic of the
following session of this conference and, therefore, I will not
devote more time to this matter. I am sure that the presentation
of the proposal by Mr. Wils, from our Legal Service, will address
all the questions you might have about our ideas in this area.
Clarification and review of the substantive rules is also an
essential pillar in the overall reform process. The review is
aimed at simplifying the rules and reducing the regulatory burden for companies, especially companies lacking market power,
while ensuring a more effective control over agreements implemented by companies holding significant market power. We
have recently completed work in the field of vertical agreements
with the adoption of a new block exemption regulation and
guidelines concerning distribution.
This issue was the subject of a roundtable discussion yesterday afternoon, where Director General Alex Schaub developed
in-depth the rationale and aims behind our reforms.
In the area of horizontal agreements, the Commission has
proposed revised block exemption regulations for Research and
Development ("R&D") agreements and Specialization agreements. These regulations are complemented by draft guidelines
on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal cooperation
agreements. The draft horizontal guidelines recognizes that
companies need to respond to increasing competitive pressure
and a changing market place driven by globalization, the speed
of technological progress, and the generally more dynamic nature of markets. Cooperation can often be a way to share risk,
2. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations
(EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87
("Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty"), COM(2000)582final,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/modernisa
tion/comm_2000_582/en.pdf.
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save costs, pool know-how, and launch innovation more quickly.
We plan to adopt all these texts before the end of this year.
Antitrust is not the only area where we need to adapt our
instruments to the changing environment. Merger control, by
now a well-established pillar of competition law, also needs to be
kept up to date in order to cope with the ever-increasing number and complexity of cases. It is for this reason that we
launched the Merger Review 2000 in June of this year. The Commission then issued a report on turnover criteria and thresholds
that divide the Commission's competence in merger control
from that of the national authorities of the Member States. The
Commission is currently examining the conclusions to be drawn
from this report and widening the reflection to other aspects of
our Merger procedures.
I should also mention that last July the Commission approved a notice establishing a simplified procedure for certain
categories of merger cases that do not raise material competition
problems and can be authorized without an in-depth investigation. This is the case, for example, where the parties' activities
do not overlap in the same market or where their combined
market share is below fifteen percent. We also plan to publish a
notice clarifying our practice in relation to remedies before the
end of the year.
In the area of State aids, the entry into force, in 1999, of the
procedural regulation was an important achievement. This regulation codifies, for the first time, the procedural rules and
makes them transparent, thereby increasing legal certainty. The
Commission can now force Member States to require interim recovery of illegally granted aid. It also sets time limits for State
aid decisions.
We are also preparing other improvements in State aid
rules, such as Block Exemption Regulations, a public register
and a Scoreboard, that will trace the performance of each Member State in this field, thus adding peer pressure to the legal enforcement instruments.
Finally, let me also stress that the Commission is paying
great attention to the competition aspects of the next enlargement of the Union. We cannot afford an enlargement that
would unbalance the equilibrium in terms of State aid or competitiveness. For this reason, we are also devoting substantial ef-
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forts to the cooperation with the candidate countries and to
make sure that the same rules will apply with equal efficiency all
across an enlarged Union.
II. THE NEW ECONOMY AND COMPETITION:
MONITORING A POTENTIAL ALLY
These processes of modernizing our legislative and interpretative rules aim to keep up with the pace of economic and technological development in the twenty-first century. The basic
principles, however, will not change. I believe that the fundamental goals of competition policy are relevant both to the old
and new economy: to the "bricks and mortar" as well as to the
"clicks and portal" sectors.
Actually, I see the new economy as a strong potential ally for
competition. The Internet and other quickly developing information technologies can bring substantial doses of transparency
to the markets, thus making them more efficient. They can also
contribute to the integration of markets, by facilitating the contracts between suppliers and customers, thus making location of
companies a much less relevant factor for competition.
The constant reallocation of resources from the declining
firms or sectors to the emerging and fast growing ones is a corollary of a well-functioning market economy. In the realm of the
"new economy," this process has become extremely rapid. It is
of paramount importance not to hinder this reallocation and to
allow transformation and restructuring to take place in a nontraumatic way, through mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures.
This process, however, is not without its dangers. Cooperation between companies can sometimes lead to anticompetitive
outcomes. Mergers may result in a market structure that is too
concentrated with poorer choices for the consumer and greater
scope for collusion between the few remaining producers. Our
task is to favor the transition towards new and more efficient
market equilibrium while, at the same time, preserving the competitive environment. In a nutshell, the role of the competition
authorities towards the new economy is to monitor a potential
ally.
Some commentators have argued that in high technology
markets there are often no real concerns of long-term dominance, due to quickly eroding entry barriers and that, therefore,
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competition policy only has a very limited role to play in these
markets.
I would caution against such an approach. Even temporary
market power can be a serious concern, particularly when it may
have a negative impact on the levels of innovation and consumer
choice in a given market.
Other commentators consider that the uncertainties surrounding the future developments of new economy markets and
the complexities associated with these sectors should discourage
competition authorities from even trying to intervene.
I cannot share this approach either. I acknowledge the difficulties linked to the assessment of cases in markets under quick
development. But our duty is to foresee as best as we can the
consequences of a given operation and to react to it if it is likely
to create competition concerns. Complexity or uncertainty
should not be reasons not to act when the interests of the consumers are at stake.
Let me turn now to explain some of our recent cases, which
will show the type of concerns for competition that can derive
from the developments linked to the new economy. I believe
they will also illustrate how the basic principles of competition
rules adapt to changing markets and industries.
In new economy sectors, where access to networks is essential to be able to provide a wide range of services, "gatekeeper"
effects can become a major concern. I refer, by this term, to
situations where a company is in control of an infrastructure that
is essential for other players to develop their business and to innovate.
Gatekeeper effects can occur as a result of both horizontal
and vertical operations. In the first case, normally the merger
between two network operators leads, through the addition of
their assets, to the creation of a facility of such a nature that
cannot be replicated by competitors.
Let me give you some examples of recent cases of this nature: one concerns a European and another a worldwide market.
First, the Vodafone/Mannesmann transaction raised competition concerns on the emerging market for pan-European
seamless mobile telephony services. The merged company, with
its extensive network, would be in a unique position vis-a-vis its
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competitors to roll out such services. In order to remedy these
concerns, Vodafone agreed to give competitors non-discriminatory access to its integrated network. However, in order to ensure that competitors would not exclusively rely on the merged
company and thereby neglecting the development of their own
infrastructure, the Commission limited the undertaking to three
years. The Commission considered, inter alia, that in this period, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System ("UMTS")
licenses would be awarded in sufficient number to allow competitors to replicate the Vodafone network.
Second, in June of this year, the Commission prohibited the
merger between the two U.S. communications companies, MCI
WorldCom and Sprint. It found that the combination of the
parties' extensive Internet networks and large customer bases
would allow the merged entity to dictate terms and conditions
for access to its Internet networks in a manner that could have
significant anticompetitive effects and hinder innovation., The
Commission's investigation, which was carried out in close cooperation with antitrust authorities in the United States, showed
that, despite liberalization, regional and local providers are still
dependent on the largest top-level providers to gain full and effective access to the Internet.
I have indicated that gatekeeper effects can also arise as a
result of vertical operations; in other words, performances between companies operating in related upstream or downstream
markets. In these cases, foreclosure concerns are likely to arise
only where one of the merging parties enjoys significant market
power. Mergers in the media sector, between content providers
and delivery operators, can lead to such concerns.
Let me comment, in this regard, on two cases in which the
Commission has very recently adopted a decision.
First, on October 11, 2000, the Commission approved the
proposed merger between America Online Inc. ("AOL") and
Time Warner Inc. ("TW") after AOL offered to sever all structural links with German media group Bertelsmann AG.
In this case, the Commission was concerned that AOL, because of its merger with TW, who in turn had planned to merge
its music recording and publishing activities with EMI, and because of its European joint ventures with Bertelsmann, would
have controlled the leading source of music publishing rights in
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Europe. The three companies (TW, EMI, and Bertelsmann) together would hold approximately fifty percent of the music publishing rights in Europe. Against this background, AOL could
have emerged as the gatekeeper in the emerging market for Internet music delivery on-line.
The proposed undertakings, and the fact that the EMI/TW
deal did not take place, will prevent AOL from having access to
Europe's leading source of music publishing rights. In view of
these facts, the Commission could approve the operation.
Secondly, on October 13, 2000, the Commission approved
the acquisition by French telecommunications and media company Vivendi and its subsidiary Canal+ of Canada's Seagram.
The Commission was concerned that the deal would give
Vivendi/Canal+ preferential or even exclusive access to Universal films' rights and, therefore, create or strengthen its existing
dominant position in pay-television in a substantial number of
countries.
The parties offered substantial undertakings to address the
competition problems. They agreed not to grant Canal+ first
window rights for more than a certain percentage of Universal
production. But, most notably, they also agreed to divest their
stake in the British pay-TV company BskyB. This will enable
BskyB to be an independent competitor to Canal+ and, at the
same time, sever any links between Universal and Fox Studios,
another major film producer controlled by the BskyB group.
You can see a certain pattern emerging from all these cases.
First, the Commission has taken action each time that it has
identified that a gatekeeper concern was likely to arise in the
short or the medium term. In most cases, however, the
problems could be limited in time or scope and solutions have
been found through granting access to competitors. When,
however, the problem could not be resolved, like in MCIWorldcom/Sprint, a prohibition was the only possible outcome.
I would also like to point out that the Commission has also
insisted on eliminating minority shareholdings or links between
competitors that could prevent effective competition in certain
markets. We did so in Vivendi/Seagram, by eliminating the
shareholding in BskyB, and in AOL/Time Warner, by severing
the link with Bertelsmann. This is an issue, however, that goes
beyond new economy cases and to which I attach much impor-
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tance. Let me also mention the case Generali/INA, where approval was conditioned on the elimination of minority shareholding in competing insurance undertakings and another case,
Renault/Volvo, that was cleared only when the latter agreed to
sell the minority stake it had bought in Scania, its major competitor in the Nordic Countries.
As I have already said, the new economy is not only a source
of new anti-competitive concerns but also creates the conditions
for several types of cooperation between companies that can
lead to efficiencies and advantages to consumers. Competition
policy should also adapt to recognize such advantages and,
therefore, not oppose these types of deals.
As a general rule, for instance, the Commission takes a positive approach towards R&D agreements between competitors,
provided that they do not have significant market power on existing markets and there is no significant reduction in innovation. The Commission, however, has sometimes also authorized
agreements between competitors where considerable market
power is created or increased by the cooperation, provided that
the parties can demonstrate significant benefits in carrying out
the R&D, a quicker launch of new products/technology, or
other efficiencies.
Cooperation to create and develop web-based business-tobusiness ("B2B") trading and B2B electronic market places is
also, in principle, expected to be a source of substantial efficiencies. They allow a reduction in transaction costs and they increase market transparency. The fact that these exchanges try to
sign up as many industry players as possible does not create a
competition problem in itself. As in the case of stock exchanges,
the efficiency of a B2B electronic market place may increase with
the number of users.
But there are, of course, issues that could raise concerns for
a competition authority. These systems, for instance, can be
used to exclude individual companies from the virtual market
place or to allow some participants to impose joint purchasing or
joint selling to others.
The Commission is following closely the current developments in this area. So far, only a few cases have been formally
notified to the Commission; others are in informal discussions
with my services. We will need to analyze carefully the workings
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of any proposed B2B trading system and its effects on the market.
I hope that these few examples have been sufficient to illustrate my firm belief that competition policy remains essential in
the new economy and to show how our instruments can adapt to
new market situations.
III. COMPETITIONAUTHORITIES AND THE GOVERNANCE
OF GLOBALISATION
Let me turn now to another market development-the increasing internationalization of our economies-that creates
very important challenges to antitrust authorities around the
world.
Indeed, competition law enforcement is taking on an increasingly international dimension: antitrust agencies all over
the world are finding that the consumers whom they are mandated to protect, are being adversely affected by anticompetitive
behavior taking place outside of their jurisdiction.
This trend also has practical consequences for companies
operating internationally. The burdens (including filing requirements and fees) associated with merger control compliance, particularly on firms seeking clearance for transnational
deals, have grown dramatically over the past decade and continue to escalate as more jurisdictions enact merger control legislation. I am also very conscious of the consequently increased
risk of inconsistency between the decisions taken in different jurisdictions.
A. Bilateral Cooperation
In response to these challenges, the Commission has
adopted a dual approach. First, and foremost, we are developing bilateral relations with the competition authorities of the
Union's major trading partners.
In this regard, special tribute should be paid to the notable
success of cooperation between the Union and the United
States, based on the agreements of 1991 and 1998. Indeed, my
services are in daily contact with their counterparts at the U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. And I
have been enjoying the quality of the cooperative relationship
with Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein-and now, I am sure,
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with Doug Melamed-as well as with Chairman Robert Pitofsky.
As a result, the risk of conflicting or inconsistent rulings has
been very much reduced: the approach of the United States and
Union authorities in the MCI Worldcom/Sprint case that I mentioned before is one concrete example of this close cooperation.
The Commission intends to further develop its bilateral cooperation with foreign antitrust agencies. Last year, a cooperation agreement between the Union and Canada entered into
force. In July of this year, we reached a mutual understanding
with Japan on the substantial elements of a similar agreement.
B. Multilateral Cooperation
Secondly, we have always believed that multilateral efforts
are necessary to ensure convergence and coordination between
the vast numbers of competition enforcement systems around
the world. It is widely known that the Commission has been very
active in ongoing efforts, in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") working parties and other
multilateral venues, to achieve cooperation among antitrust enforcement authorities. It was an initiative from my predecessor
as Competition Commissioner, Karel Van Miert, which helped
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to create a Competition
Working Group.
Since our first proposals in 1996, we have pioneered this
idea and have actively proposed the negotiation of a Multilateral
Framework Agreement on Competition Policy in the WTO.
Such a framework would include core principles on competition
law and would serve to underpin the impressive progress that
has been made in trade liberalization over the past few decades,
by ensuring that governmental barriers to trade are not replaced
by private ones that have the same effect.
On the other hand, it is beyond any doubt very valuable to
envisage some kind of international venue to discuss among interested competition authorities-including ones from developing countries and countries in transition-more complex competition issues.
Against this background, I was particularly pleased by the
announcement made in Brussels last month by former Assistant
Attorney General Joel Klein and the articulated proposal
presented yesterday by Acting Assistant Attorney General Doug
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Melamed. An opening to multilateralism in competition matters
beyond the OECD by such authoritative individuals is a very important development that we appreciate as a constructive step.
We are currently examining a number of different options
regarding the best format and venue for such an event, the issues that will be put on the table, and the authorities that will be
invited to participate. We welcome constructive ideas from the
United States and other like-minded competition authorities
and I can assure you that we are prepared to consider them with
an open and constructive mind.
CONCLUSION
Consumers and companies alike are increasingly citizens of
a globalized economy. We, the competition authorities, have the
increasingly difficult mission of ensuring that the integrating
markets are made and maintained competitive, thus making the
globalization process both economically more efficient and sociably more acceptable.
This requires each competition authority, and all of us collectively, to globalize our thinking first, then our basic approaches, and perhaps one day our instruments. In my view, our
institutions represent that sort of market friendly strong public
powers that are called upon to provide a pragmatic example of
effective response of international governance to the integration
of markets.
In the Union, the Commission and the national competition authorities are determined to operate more and more as a
network, in order to fully achieve this aim in today's and tomorrow's enlarged Union. With this tradition in our genetic
code, and with the experience of forging and applying competition rules in a set of integrating economies for over forty years,
the Commission can only be a convinced, and I hope, a convincing, advocate of a global effort to meet-or, I would prefer, to
anticipate-the challenges ahead of us all.

